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Abstract
Do illegal drugs foster public corruption? To estimate the causal e¤ect of drugs
on public corruption in California, we adopt the synthetic control method and exploit
the fact that crack cocaine markets emerged asynchronously across the United States.
We focus on California because crack arrived here in 1981, before reaching any other
state. Our results show that public corruption more than tripled in California in the
rst three years following the arrival of crack cocaine. We argue that this resulted from
the particular characteristics of illegal drugs: a large trade-o¤ between prots and law
enforcement, due to a cheap technology and rigid demand. Such a trade-o¤ fosters a
convergence of interests between criminals and corrupted public o¢ cials resulting in a
positive causal impact of illegal drugs on corruption.
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1 Introduction
It has been suggested that the arrival of crack cocaine to the United States in the 1980s
was responsible for the signicant increase in drug related deaths and crime rates in low-
income and inner-city neighborhoods see, for instance, Chitwood et al. (1996), Bourgois
(2003), and Fryer et al. (2013) not to mention the widening black-white education gap,
see Evans et al. (2016). But can drug markets initiate a vicious cycle that results in more
institutionalized corruption and thus pose a further important problem for society?
We argue that illegal drug prots, public corruption and law enforcement co-evolve.
On the one hand, while inexpensive technology and rigid demand can lead to substantial
drugs prots in an environment of weak law enforcement, when law enforcement is more
rigorous (including aggressive drugs seizures and arrests) prots tend to zero. Thus drug
prots depend elastically on law enforcement. On the other hand, given the share of prots
allocated to corruption (for instance, bribing public o¢ cials), the larger the prots, the larger
the funds allocated to corruption, and the less law enforcement. This system of relationships
implies the following process: prots increase corruption, corruption in turn decreases law
enforcement, which increases prots. Such a process clearly shows that law enforcement,
prots and corruption are endogenous. Nevertheless, it suggests that if a new drug market
emerges in a particular state and the prots of that particular drug are substantial, then
corruption in that state should increase too.
We are not the rst ones to emphasize the link between organized crime and corruption.
For instance, Europol (2017) reports that organized crime groups in Europe (particularly
those involved in drug tra¢ cking) heavily rely on corruption for the smooth running of their
activities. This is also explained in a report by the Australian Crime Commission (2015):
"the large prots available in Australias illicit drug markets are a strong motivator for or-
ganised crime groups to develop the capability to corrupt in order to facilitate access to those
markets". Transparency International (2011) provides further evidence that while organized
crime feeds corruption, corruption also feeds organized crime. Transnational tra¢ cking of
drugs, for example, relies on smuggling and on avoiding investigation; both are directly en-
abled by corruption. Interestingly, UNODC (2017) dedicates a whole booklet on the topic
of the drug problem, organized crime and corruption, arguing that the rise of an illicit econ-
omy helps to weaken the rule of law and facilitates corruption, which in turn reinforces the
illicit drug sector.1 However, while all of these institutions report that drug markets and
corruption are related, they do not investigate this link quantitatively (most likely due to
1See also Gounev and Bezlov (2010) who study organized crime groupsuse of corruption and argue that
that illegal drugs markets and prostitution exert the most corruptive e¤ect in the European Union.
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the availability of the data), but instead call for more systematic research to understand the
impact of drugs on corruption.
We test our hypothesis that illegal drugs foster public corruption using data on crack
cocaine and public corruption from U.S. states between 1976 and 1985. We select crack
cocaine because of three main reasons. Firstly, given that it is more cost e¤ective to produce
and easier to develop (as compared to say cocaine), it is highly protable for drug sellers and
street gangs; see, for instance, Jacobs (1999), DEA (1991), and Bourgois (2003).2 Secondly,
it is relatively cheap and a highly addictive substance, with a short lasting but instantaneous
and intense high, giving the drug a large potential consumer base and creating a rigid demand
(Chitwood et al. (1996) and Bourgois (2003)). Not only is it consumed all over the world,
but it ranks second in terms of recreational drugs consumption after cannabis (Karila et al.
(2014)). Finally, and most importantly, crack cocaine is key for our identication strategy,
allowing us to exploit the lag in its initial arrival to each U.S. state and utilize the synthetic
control method (SCM) to estimate its causal e¤ect on public corruption. This is precisely
why we are interested in California, as crack cocaine arrived here in 1981, before reaching any
other state. Not to mention that cocaine usage in California is substantially higher than the
average state in America; in fact Los Angeles is considered the worlds largest retail market
for cocaine and the epicenter of the U.S. crack economy (see, for instance, Murch (2015)).
Nevertheless, the basic relationship tested here does not depend specically on crack but
is equally applicable to any other recreational drug (which is highly protability and has a
rigid demand), such as crystal meth; consumption of which has (once again) lead to a "meth
crisis" in the United States.
The contribution of our work thus lies in showing the existence of a positive causal
e¤ect of drug markets on corruption in advanced democracies such as the United States.
We unveil this relationship applying a recently developed econometrics approach, i.e. the
synthetic control method (SCM), to estimate if and to what extent the crack market fostered
public corruption in California. Our results show that public corruption more than tripled
in California in the rst three years following the arrival of crack cocaine, with this result
being robust to alternative SCM weighting and corroborated by the placebo studies.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study to systematically examine the causal
relationship between drugs and public corruption, and we believe that our ndings con-
tribute to the current public debate on the design of anti-corruption policies. Indeed, we
share the view that public corruption is a key problem in society and, as argued by the In-
2See also Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) for the nancial activities of a particular street gang in Chicago
and for an indication of the protability of the crack cocaine organization. They show that the central gang
leadership as well as the local leaders made substantial net prots; although note that these prots are most
likely understated.
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ternational Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde recently, makes it di¢ cult
(if not impossible) to achieve sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic growth.3 Thus,
establishing the causal e¤ect of drug markets on corruption is important because it signals
that a strategy to combat corruption should be integrated with a strategy to combat drugs
markets too.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how the strength of the
trade-o¤between prots and law enforcement associated with any illegal good matters in the
relationship between drugs prots and corruption, and why crack features a strong trade-o¤
and thus o¤ers an interesting natural experiment to understand this relationship. Section 3
describes the data used and investigates if there exists any relationship between alternative
measures of public corruption and crack cocaine. Finding extensive evidence showing a
positive correlation between these variables, we describe our empirical methodology and
investigate the existence of a causal impact of crack on public corruption in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Characteristics of Crack Cocaine
Crack cocaine is a potent smoked version of cocaine. It is easily produced by making a
solution of baking soda, water, and cocaine powder. Arguably, it was the commercial answer
to a cocaine glut problem in the United States in the early 1980s, which caused cocaine prices
to plunge (by as much as 80%). Interestingly the emergence of crack markets, as determined
by cocaine-related deaths associated with crack (see Section 3 for details), was state specic
in the sense that it arrived to each state at a di¤erent point in time and in many cases
several years apart. There are several reasons for why it did not take long before crack usage
became widespread in the U.S., so much so that it lead to the American crack epidemic. To
start with, crack was more addictive than cocaine due to its ability to produce a quicker but
shorter and more intense high. Thus making the occasional or intermittent use of crack much
harder than cocaine. Crack was also substantially cheaper, and when introduced, purer than
cocaine (DEA (1991)). Given that it could be sold in smaller quantities, it was therefore
more a¤ordable than cocaine. Finally, unlike cocaine, crack took root in inner city areas
su¤ering social deprivation. All of these characteristics led to a fast-growing new market
somewhat parallel to cocaine powder, and to a sharp increase of overall prots. The impact
of this new drug market was also marked by a sudden increase in health problems during
the 1980s. According to data from Drug Abuse Warning Network, hospital emergencies
related to cocaine rose by 12 percent in 1985 and by an astonishing 110 percent in 1986
3For more details see: https://blogs.imf.org/2017/12/08/corruption-disruption/
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(from 26,300 to 55,200), see DEA (1991). Moreover, between 1984 and 1987 emergency
room visits attributed to cocaine incidents (for instance, overdoses, suicide attempts, and
detoxication to mention but a few) increased fourfold.
Beyond the above characteristics, we argue that crack markets induce a large trade-o¤
between prots and law enforcement. Generally, any illegal good has such a trade-o¤ and
can activate a circular process in which a share of the prots are devoted to corrupt public
o¢ cials so as to reduce law enforcement, which in turn increase prots. Yet, each illegal
good features its own trade-o¤, and the larger the trade-o¤, the larger the incentive as well
as the opportunity to reduce law enforcement via corruption. This suggests that the speed
of the process driving the co-evolution of prots, corruption and law enforcement increases
in the size of the trade-o¤ between prots and law enforcement. Interestingly, crack exhibits
a signicant trade-o¤ for two reasons. First, its production, transportation and selling costs
are negligible without law enforcement. It is well known, in fact, that the value added
of cocaine exponentially increases from coca leaves and cocaine powder in the production
countries, to cocaine powder in each of the intermediate steps before end users. For example,
as indicated by Stewart (2016), a kilogram of cocaine powder is priced at $2,200 in the jungles
in Colombias interior, between $5,500 and $7,000 at Colombian ports, $10,000 in Central
America, $12,000 in southern Mexico, $16,000 in the border towns of northern Mexico, and
nally between $24,000 and $27,000 wholesale in the United States. Perhaps more striking,
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000), based on data gathered over four years from a street gang in
Chicago, argue that one kilogram of pure cocaine converted to crack would have a street
value of between $100,000 and $150,000 (in 1995 dollars). Second, crack exhibits a large
trade-o¤ because it is highly addictive, creating a rigid demand (Crane and Rivolo (1997)).
Therefore, its business can generate a huge extraction of resources from addicted consumers.
Yet, this can only occur if criminals and corrupted government o¢ cials cooperate. For these
reasons, crack cocaine exhibits a signicant trade-o¤ between prots and law enforcement,
which led us to conjecture that its arrival in the U.S. caused an increase in institutionalized
corruption.
These characteristics of crack, namely a new market for a highly addictive and protable
drug, a large trade-o¤ between prots and law enforcement, as well as time di¤erences in its
initial arrival across the U.S., provides a useful natural experiment that allow us to design
an identication strategy via the SCM.
4
3 Preliminary Evidence based on Correlations
To examine the relationship between crack cocaine and public corruption, we construct a
dataset of a panel of U.S. states over the period 1976 to 1985. In order to identify the arrival
and presence of crack markets within a city or a state we rely on the approach of Evans
et al. (2016), which is based on cocaine related deaths in a particular area. Specically,
their index of the arrival of crack cocaine is based on the rst of two consecutive years where
cocaine-related deaths are reported in each U.S. state. To illustrate why the increase in
cocaine related death has been attributed to the use of crack, we note that while in 1981
cocaine-related deaths in the whole country was recorded at 8, following the introduction of
crack cocaine and a rapid increase in its usage as a recreational drug, that number increased
substantially over time reaching 523 and 1497 deaths in 1989 and 1998, respectively. Based
on the Evans et al. (2016) index, crack cocaine markets rst emerged in California (from
here onward CA) in 1981,4 while in most of the other states crack cocaine markets emerged
after 1985.
We next obtain data on public corruption from the United States Department of Justices
annual "Report to Congress on the activities and operations of the public integrity section".
These reports, which have been used by other scholars to study the causes and consequences
of corruption (see, for instance, Alt and Lassen (2003), Campante and Do (2014), and Glaeser
and Saks (2006)), are available from 1976 and enable us to collect information on the number
of federal convictions for corruption-related crimes by state during the period of interest.5
Before addressing the question of whether illegal drugs foster institutionalized corrup-
tion we wondered if there exists any correlation at all between these two variables. This
preliminary question matters as, not being bounded to search for a causal relationship, we
could rely on a more extensive playground to get insights. To address this question we
use the Fryer et al. (2013) crack cocaine prevalence index as our measure of crack con-
sumption. Fryer et al. (2013) uses factor analysis to construct a state and city-specic index
using several proxies for crack cocaine consumption including (i) cocaine arrests, (ii) cocaine-
related emergency room (ER) visits, (iii) frequency of crack cocaine mentions in newspapers,
(iv) cocaine-related drug deaths, and (v) the number of Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) drug seizures. Figure 1(a) plots the relationship between the crack cocaine index
4Note that while the emergence of crack in CA in 1981 is based on the rst of two consecutive years where
cocaine-related deaths are reported, it is also robust to alternative measures such as: two of three years, or
three years in row.
5Note that the corruption prosecutions are at the federal and not at the state and local levels. This is
because the U.S. Department of Justice only records data at the federal level. Nevertheless, as has been
argued, federal prosecutors handle an overwhelming majority of public corruption cases (between 8094
percent). See, for instance, Cordis and Milyo (2016) and references therein.
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Figure 1: Scatter Plots of Crack Cocaine and Alternative Measures of Public
Corruption
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Notes: The crack cocaine index is a measure of crack cocaine consumption from Fryer et al. (2013), averaged
over all available years: 19802000. Public corruption is captured by three alternative measures: (i) the
number of federal convictions for corruption-related crimes (averaged over 19762002), (ii) the corruption
index built by Campante and Do (2014) from an online search in 2009, and (iii) the Boylan and Long (2003)
measure of corruption based on a public corruption perception survey of State House reporters in 2003,
respectively. Source: Authorscalculations.
(averaged over all available years: 19802000) and the number of federal convictions for
corruption-related crimes (averaged over 19762002), from which we can see a weak positive
relationship between the two. In fact using two alternative measures of public corruption
in panels (b) and (c), namely the corruption index built by Campante and Do (2014) from
an online search in 2009 and the Boylan and Long (2003) measure of corruption based on a
public corruption perception survey of State House reporters in 2003 respectively, we nd a
much stronger positive relationship between crack consumption and corruption. Therefore,
regardless of our measure of public corruption, Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence of a
positive correlation between crack cocaine and various measures of public corruption in the
United States.
Further evidence of this relationship is provided in Figure 2, which relates the emergence
of crack to average public corruption across all U.S. states. The x-axis shows years before
and after "year zero" in which, for the rst time, the crack market emerged based on the
Evans et al. (2016) index. The y-axis shows average public corruption (using data from the
Department of Justice) across U.S. states. Note that since crack markets emerged asynchro-
nously across America, each state features its own "year zero". Average corruption across
states is then computed at their year zero (dot corresponding to zero on the x-axis), at their
year + 1 (dot corresponding to 1 on the x-axis), and so on; allowing us to track average
public corruption before and after the emergence of crack markets. As can be seen clearly
from Figure 2, there is a sharp increase in corruption in the years following the arrival of
6
Figure 2: Emergence of Crack Cocaine Markets and Average Public Corruption
in the United States
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Notes: The x-axis shows years before and after "year zero" in which, for the rst time, the crack market
emerged based on the Evans et al. (2016) index. The y-axis shows average public corruption (using data
from the United States Department of Justice) across U.S. states. Source: Authorscalculations.
crack cocaine.
Overall, Figures 1 and 2 show a positive relationship between crack cocaine consumption
and corruption, providing preliminary evidence in support of our hypothesis that illegal
drug markets can foster corruption. Below we will use a recently developed econometrics
approach, i.e. the synthetic control methods (SCM), to estimate if and to what extent the
crack market fostered public corruption in California.
4 Estimating the E¤ects of Crack Cocaine on Public
Corruption in California
A recent and powerful econometric tool for addressing the causality issue in the context of our
study, as randomized control experiments are not feasible, is the synthetic control method
(SCM), an approach developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010,
2015). In fact our study is an ideal application for the SCM as crack cocaine markets in
the U.S. emerged in some states much earlier than others. To utilize the SCM approach we
need to know when the crack cocaine market rst emerged in each state. To this end (and
as discussed in Section 3) we use the Evans et al. (2016) index according to which although
crack markets rst arrived in California in 1981, they had emerged in most states after 1985
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(an indication of how fast growing the market for this drug was). It is precisely this lag in
the arrival of crack across the U.S. that enables us to apply the SCM. Note that in order
to get a comprehensive donor pool as well as reasonable pre/post periods for our analysis,
we only include states which did not report two consecutive years of cocaine-related deaths
before 1985, leaving us with the 29 states in Table 1.
Table 1: List of the 29 States in the Donor Pool
State Arrival of Crack State Arrival of Crack
Alabama 1986 Nebraska 1987
Alaska - Nevada 1987
Arkansas 1987 New Hampshire -
Connecticut 1986 New Jersey 1986
Delaware 1988 North Carolina 1987
Hawaii - North Dakota -
Idaho - Ohio 1986
Iowa 1988 Oklahoma 1988
Kentucky 1987 Oregon 1987
Louisiana 1985 South Dakota -
Maine - Tennessee 1986
Massachusetts 1986 West Virginia 1987
Minnesota 1986 Wisconsin 1987
Mississippi 1986 Wyoming -
Montana -
Notes: Following the approach in Evans et al. (2016), the arrival year of crack cocaine is based on the rst
of two consecutive years where cocaine-related deaths are reported in each U.S. state. indicates that the
arrival of crack was not reported in Evans et al. (2016) as crack cocaine markets did not emerge in those
states.
As mentioned before, we are interested in CA because crack cocaine arrived in this state
in 1981, before any other. CA is also an obvious case to study the relationship between
illicit drugs and public corruption as consumption of these drugs is much larger on the U.S.
west coast, and because cocaine usage in CA is substantially higher than the average state
in America. In fact Los Angeles is considered the worlds largest retail market for cocaine
and the epicenter of the U.S. crack economy; see, for instance, Murch (2015).
Before presenting our results we give a brief description of the empirical methodology
employed in this paper. The SCM builds on the di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) approach
which has been an important tool to test the causal impacts of policy interventions since the
1990s. The DID method is based on comparing two groups of observations: one is a¤ected
by a specic treatment (e.g. policy interventions), and thus is called the treatment group;
the other is similar to the treatment group except that it is not a¤ected by the treatment
and is therefore called the control group. The DID method compares changes in outcome for
the treatment group before and after the treatment with that in the control group in order
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to get information on the impact of the treatment above and beyond the potential impacts
from exogenous factors which are time invariant. Dealing with potential endogeneity issues,
the DID estimator helps isolating the impacts from the treatment.
SCM enhances the DID method by using weighted average of a set of controls instead of
a single control group. This innovation allows one not only to control for time invariant vari-
ables, o¤ered by the DID approach, but also to control for the variables which are changing
over time. More specically, the SCM rst considers a period prior to an exogenous inter-
vention which is being evaluated (in our case the emergence of crack markets) to match the
examined case (i.e. CA) with the weighted combination of some of the most representative
cases in the donor pool (in our application the 29 U.S. states in Table 1, where crack markets
were either not established or were introduced with a time lag after CA). The matching is
based on the outcome variables of interest (i.e. public corruption) and its predictors (for
instance, the size of the government and GDP per capita). The resulting weighted combina-
tions in the donor pool forms the synthetic control (synthetic CA) which is most similar to
the examined group except for the absence of the intervention. SCM then compares changes
in the outcome variables in the examined case after the intervention period with those in the
synthetic control to evaluate the causal e¤ect of intervention on the outcome variables.
According to Athey and Imbens (2017) the synthetic control approach is the most im-
portant innovation in the policy evaluation literature over the last 15 years. It soon became
popular due to its simplicity and e¤ectiveness and has been employed to address some of
the fundamental questions in economics. Examples include a study to evaluate the eco-
nomic costs of conict in the Basque Country in northern Spain (Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003)); the estimation of the economic impact of the 1990 German reunication (Abadie
et al. (2015)); the impact of economic liberalization on real GDP per capita (Billmeier
and Nannicini (2013)); the impact of natural disasters on economic growth (Cavallo et al.
(2013)), and estimation of the e¤ect of Californias Tobacco control program (Abadie et al.
(2010)), to name but a few.
4.1 Results
The SCM methodology allows us to understand the a¢ nity between CA and a synthetic
CA, the latter consisting of a weighted average of states chosen from the donor pool of 29
in Table 1. In our application, the set of predictors of public corruption based on which the
synthetic CA is constructed as a weighted average of potential control states are: (i) the
natural logarithm of GDP per capita, (ii) the natural logarithm of population, (iii) the share
of government employment (all obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis), as
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well as (iv) public corruption in selective years prior to arrival of crack cocaine to the United
States. Note that the aforementioned variables have been used as a determinant of public
corruption in other studies, see, for instance, Campante and Do (2014).
It turns out that the evolution of public corruption in CA prior to the emergence of
the cocaine market is best reproduced by a combination of three states, namely Alabama,
Alaska, and Ohio with the assigned weights being 0.240, 0.446, and 0.314 respectively. All
the other states in the donor pool are therefore assigned a weight equal to zero. In Table 2 we
report the pre-treatment characteristics of CA as well as synthetic California. Contrasting
the values of the predictors as well as the past values of public corruption across real and
synthetic CA, it is clear that the values are very similar.
Table 2: Public Corruption Predictor Means
California
Variables Real Synthetic
natural logarithm of GDP per capita 10.3 10.5
natural logarithm of population 16.9 14.5
share of government employment 0.17 0.23
public corruption in 1976 11.0 8.58
public corruption in 1978 6.0 6.48
public corruption in 1980 12.0 12.0
Source: United States Department of Justices "Report to Congress on the activities and operations of the
public integrity section" and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Having established that synthetic CA is a suitable control group for CA, we plot in
Figure 3 the evolution of public corruption in CA as well as its synthetic counterpart over
the period 1976 to 1985. As can be seen synthetic CA closely resembles real CA in terms of
corruption over the period prior to the emergence of the crack market. This is in line with
the close values of the predictors in CA with respect to synthetic CA between 1976 and 1981,
which suggests that the latter correctly approximates the degree of public corruption in the
former should the crack market have not emerged. Importantly, the discrepancy between
the two after 1981, shows a large positive e¤ect of the emergence of crack markets on public
corruption. Specically, in 1984 institutionalized corruption in CA was more than three
times larger than what it would have been if crack cocaine was not introduced in this state.
The results are robust with respect to any particular pre-period public corruption that we
use as a predictor in our SCM analysis (as opposed to the ones currently used: 1976, 1978,
1980), as well as di¤erent subset of public corruption predictors.6 We also observe a time
6We would have liked to use the data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)
database, constructed from Freedom of Information Act requests from the U.S. Department of Justice, as
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lag between the emergence of crack (1981) and when the gap between real and synthetic CA
becomes signicant. This is expected as there is a delay from detection to conviction; more
specically, according to Cordis and Milyo (2016) the average delay is less than 2 years.
Figure 3: Evolution of Corruption: California vs. Synthetic California
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Notes: Public corruption is the number of federal convictions for corruption-related crimes.
We next verify that the increase in corruption in CA is not an artefact due to a possible
increase in law enforcement. It could be argued that the crack epidemic triggered an increase
in the number of law enforcement o¢ cers, which in turn lead to discovery of and reporting of
corruption which had been in place before the emergence of crack markets. In this case, the
level of corruption might not have increased at all with respect to the pre-crack period, only
crime detection would have increased. To verify that the surge in the corruption statistics is
not a spurious observation, we obtain data on the number of law enforcement employees in
each state from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Police Employee Database so as
to compare the number of law enforcement o¢ cers in CA with the average in all other U.S.
states. We plot these two series in Figure 4 over the period 1975 to 1990, from which it is
clear that in the years prior and after the emergence of crack markets in CA (namely 1981),
the number of per capita o¢ cers in CA was very similar to that of the average in other US
states. In fact the number of o¢ cers in CA and all other states are pretty much identical in
the years 1980 to 1984. Therefore, we nd no evidence that the emergence of crack markets
in CA led to an exogenous intervention by law enforcement agencies. Indeed, as argued by
Murch (2015), the militarization of policing and the war on crack in Los Angeles started
an alternative measure of public corruption. However, this data is only available from 1986 onward and
therefore cannot be used in our application as we need data from before 1981 (prior to the emergence of
crack markets in CA).
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much later (in the winter of 1985) with a number of initiatives (including new and brutal
technologies of policing) by the Los Angeles Police Department.
Figure 4: Law Enforcement Employees: California vs. other U.S. States
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Source: Authors calculation based on data from the Federal Bureau of Investigations Police Employee
Database, see FBI (2017).
4.2 Placebo Studies
To make sure that our results are reliable and not driven by chance, we follow Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) and perform di¤erent placebo tests. In the
rst battery of tests we set a random date for the placebo intervention and we keep only
the period before the emergence of crack cocaine market in CA; i.e. years prior to 1981.
Figure 5(a) displays the results of our in-time placebo study. Despite having small number
of pre-intervention time periods the evolution of public corruption in synthetic CA is very
close to that of CA. Therefore, in contrast to the results in Figure 3, the two never diverge
and the in-time placebo intervention has no e¤ect, which suggests that the gap in Figure 3
is not random.
We next display the results of the in-space placebo study in Figure 5(b). This is based
on replicating the synthetic control method for every control state in the donor pool while
shifting CA in the pool of donors. The grey lines show the di¤erence in public corruption
between each state in the donor pool and its corresponding synthetic version, what is know as
the gap. As can be seen, our estimated e¤ect of interest falls well outside of the distribution
of placebo e¤ects. This suggests that unlike CA, the synthetic control approach estimate
12
Figure 5: Placebo Studies
(a) In-Time Placebo Test (b) In-Space Placebo Test
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Notes: Public corruption is the number of federal convictions for corruption-related crimes. Panel (b) shows
the public corruption gaps in California and placebo gaps in all 29 control states, see Table 1.
insignicant e¤ects for all of the 29 U.S. states (see Table 1) who are not a¤ected by the
intervention (i.e. emergence of crack cocaine markets).
4.3 Robustness to Alternative Weighting
We perform one nal exercise in order to ensure that our results are robust in terms of
alternative weighting. Given that Alaska and Ohio, which have the largest weights in our
synthetic CA, might not be an obvious representation of CA, we take these two states out of
the donor pool and redo our analysis. Excluding these two states, we nd that a combination
of Louisiana (0.413), Massachusetts (0.214), and New Jersey (0.373), with the weights in the
brackets, can best reproduce the trend in public corruption in CA before the emergence
of crack. Figures 6(a) and (b) display public corruption in CA vs. synthetic CA and the
in-space placebo test in the absence of those two states, respectively. Clearly the results in
Figure 6 is in line with our previous ndings, showing a large positive e¤ect of the emergence
of crack markets on public corruption in CA, and thereby illustrating the robustness of our
results. Note that we also did an exercise by removing Alaska and Ohio separately and found
very similar results.
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Figure 6: Evolution of Corruption: California vs. Synthetic California (based
on alternative weighting)
(a) California vs. Synthetic California (b) In-Space Placebo Test
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Notes: Public corruption is the number of federal convictions for corruption-related crimes. Panel (b) shows
the public corruption gaps in California and placebo gaps in all 27 control states (without Alaska and Ohio),
see Table 1.
5 Conclusion
Using data on crack cocaine and public corruption from U.S. states between 1976 and 1985,
we contributed to the literature by examining whether illegal drugs foster corruption. We
selected crack cocaine as its characteristics, namely a new market for a highly addictive
and protable drug, a large trade-o¤ between prots and law enforcement, as well as time
di¤erences in its initial arrival across the U.S., provided us with a useful natural experiment,
allowing us to design an identication strategy via the synthetic control method.
Estimating the causal e¤ect of drugs on public corruption in California (we focus on CA
because crack arrived in this state before any other), we nd that the emergence of crack
markets led to a signicant increase in public corruption. Specically, in 1984 institution-
alized corruption in CA was more than three times larger than what it would have been
if crack cocaine was not introduced in this state. Our results suggests that drug markets,
featuring a large trade-o¤ between illegal prots and law enforcement, can be an important
source of public corruption.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study to systematically examine the causal
relationship between drugs and public corruption, and we believe that our ndings contribute
to the current public debate on the design of anti-corruption policies. Given that public
14
corruption makes it di¢ cult to achieve sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic growth,
we argue that a strategy to combat corruption should be integrated with a strategy to combat
drugs markets too.
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